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The Evolution of Gender Earnings Gaps and Discrimination in Urban China: 1988-1995* 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of market liberalization on gender earnings differentials and 
discrimination against women in urban China at the beginning of the 90s. The observed stability in the overall 
gender earnings gap between 1988 and 1995 is shown to result from a complex set of evolutions across 
enterprises, earnings distributions and time. Our results highlight the interplay of opposing forces, economic 
reforms contributing to changes in managers’ behaviors in different dimensions. On the one hand, by 
bringing more competition, liberalization favored a reduction in discriminating behaviors in both urban 
collectives and foreign-invested enterprises; on the other hand, by relaxing institutional rules, it led to a 
loosening of the government’s egalitarian wage setting policies, leaving more space for discrimination in state-
owned enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese urban labor market has experienced tremendous structural changes since 1978, which 
have been widely documented over the last ten years. The expected impact of these changes on the 
male/female earnings gap however remains ambiguous. Indeed from a theoretical point of view, as stressed 
by Liu et al. (2000), opposing forces may be at stake. On the one side, the Maoist egalitarian ideology aimed at 
reducing any type of discrimination; relaxing the power of the State on wage setting mechanisms may thus 
have brought back to the surface some patriarchal Confucian forces, leading to an increase in the 
male/female wage gap. On the other hand, increased competition induced by the reforms may have 
encouraged profit-based behaviors. As a source of inefficiency, discrimination mechanisms may thus have 
decreased.  
 From an empirical point of view, evidence on the impact of labor market reforms on the 
male/female wage gap in urban China is also unclear. Relatively few studies have addressed the issue and 
findings are very much contrasted1. Liu et al. (2000) find larger gender wage differentials in the private sector 
                                                 
1 We restrict here to analyses on urban gender wage gaps only, although a large literature also deals with gender wage 
differentials in rural China. See Dong et al. (2004), Ho et al. (2002), Meng (1998), Meng and Miller (1995), Rozelle et al. 
(2002). 
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than in both the state and the collective sectors in two coastal cities (Jinan and Shanghai) in 1995. However, 
they show that the relative share of discrimination in the overall gender wage gap substantially reduces across 
ownership from the state to the private sector. Their interpretation is that market competition has actually 
lessened the importance of discrimination in total wage differential. Using 1991 data collected in 26 cities and 
12 provinces, Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) also find that the size of the male/female wage gap tends to 
increase with the degree of market liberalization. However, when taking into account differences in the wage 
structure, they show that much of the larger gender wage gaps in the most liberalized sectors (joint-venture 
and collective) can be explained by a greater degree of wage dispersion. They conclude that their analysis 
provides “no empirical support to the hypothesis of reform-induced increases in labor market discrimination 
against women” (p. 728)2. Using data on Beijing and Guangdong in 1993, Qian (1996) finds different 
patterns, the gender wage gap being the largest in the collective sector (14%) and the smallest in the foreign 
sector (1%). Although not decomposing by ownership, Qian finds that labor-market discrimination is 
responsible for more than half of the observed overall gender wage gap in both Beijing and Guangdong. On 
the same dataset as the one used in this paper, Gustafsson and Li (2000) show that, although the male/female 
wage gap still remains at a low level in urban China as compared to international standards, it has been 
slightly increasing over the 1988-1995 period. Like Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), they show that this 
modest increase in earnings differential is driven by increased income inequality in urban China rather than by 
a deterioration of the relative position of women in the earnings distribution. Using the same dataset, Bishop 
et al. (2005) employ quantile regressions to examine returns to human capital characteristics at various 
quantiles in the earnings distribution. They find that while the earnings gap has increased, the unexplained 
fraction of the gap has declined over time, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Lastly, using 
annual data from 1988 to 1999, Liu et al. (2004) find a slight increase in gender wage gaps over time, explained 
by the conjunction of increasing rewards to observed and unobserved skills (inducing an increased 
discrimination) and converging skill levels between men and women. Using the same national cross-section 
                                                 
2 Using the same database, Hughes and Maurer-Fazio (2002) explore gender wage gaps for both married and unmarried 
workers. They highlight less discrimination against single women in the most liberalized sector (joint-ventures), but the 
reverse for married women, for whom the unexplained wage differential is the highest.  
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data from 1988 to 1997, Ng (2005) finds that discrimination against women in urban China is higher in the 
most liberalized part of China (the coastal region) and that this pattern becomes more pronounced over time. 
 Previous studies have followed two types of approach to address the gender wage gap issue in urban 
China. The first approach consists in comparing different ownership enterprises characterized by different 
levels of exposure to market forces (Qian, 1996; Liu et al., 2000; Maurer-Fazio and Hughes, 2002; Hughes and 
Maurer-Fazio, 2002). The second approach consists in the comparison of discrimination levels observed at 
two or more points in time (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Liu et al., 2004; Bishop et al., 2005; Ng, 2005). These 
approaches being complementary, our paper tries to address jointly the question of the differences in the 
male/female earnings gap across ownership sectors and over time. On the same data set, Gustafsson and Li 
(2000) have provided the baseline for the analysis of the effects of economic reforms on the relative 
economic status of women. Our paper adds to their analysis by including a subdivision of the sample by 
ownership, which allows for further analyses of the impact of labor market liberalization on the gender 
earnings gap. Moreover, our decompositions run from microsimulation at the individual level allow us to 
analyze the discrimination issue along the income distribution and to highlight non-uniform patterns in the 
evolution of discrimination. 
China’s transition towards a market economy has gradually promoted the development of the non-
state sector composed of collective enterprises, private or individual enterprises and foreign-invested 
enterprises. These different ownerships correspond to different degrees of openness to market forces, leading 
to a strongly segmented labor market structure (Dong and Bowles, 2002; Zhao, 2002; Chen et al., 2005). 
Comparing discrimination levels between enterprises of different ownership and their evolution thus provides 
valuable information on the specific impact of reforms increasing market competition.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 3 presents the data 
and provides descriptive statistics on gender wage differentials by ownership and over time. Section 4 
discusses earnings functions estimations and section 5 presents decomposition results for the male/female 
earnings gap across ownership sectors and over time.  Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Methodology 
 In order to analyze male/female earnings gaps for different ownership enterprises, Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions (Blinder; 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) are run on three dimensions: gender, enterprise ownership and 
time. These decompositions provide evaluations of the magnitude and the evolution of discrimination 
phenomena.  
 
2. 1. Modeling total earnings 
Let  represent earnings for individual i belonging to gender s observed at date t.  depends on 
two sets of arguments: individual characteristics ( ), and a set of parameters corresponding to the earnings 
model linking individual characteristics with observed earnings ( ). The wage generating process can thus 
be expressed as a function W of these two sets of arguments: 
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2. 2. Dynamic decomposition  
 Using this general specification, decompositions can be applied in different dimensions. For the sake 
of simplicity, the gender earnings gap is represented here as the difference between average male earnings and 
average female earnings3. First, the observed evolution of the gender earnings gap between two dates (t and 
T) can be decomposed as follows4: 
                                                 
3 In the application that follows, male/female earnings gaps are measured as the difference between average male 
earnings and average female earnings as a percentage of average female earnings.  
4 The following procedure is very much in the line of extensions of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to the time 
dimension initiated by Blau and Beller (1988), Smith and Welch (1989) and Wellington (1993). We chose this approach 
over the one initiated by Juhn et al. (1991) because our empirical findings show significant differences between men’s and 
women’s models concerning returns to observed characteristics, which violates the core (implicit) assumption underlying 
the procedure proposed by Juhn et al. (1991) (Datta Gupta et al., 2000). 
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 The procedure proposed in equations (3) and (4) allows for a decomposition of the observed change 
in the earnings gap into: 
i) A pure effect of changes in discrimination, keeping population structures fixed (that of date T in 
equation 3). 
ii) A pure effect of changes in characteristics, keeping remuneration structures fixed (that of date t in 
equation 4). 
 
2. 3. Static decompositions by gender 
The same type of decomposition procedure can be applied to the gender earnings gap for any given 
year t as follows: 
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 In the same line as for dynamic decomposition, this decomposition corresponds to the evaluation of 
what would be the observed male/female earnings gap for year t under the following conditions: 
i) If men and women were sharing the same socio-demographic characteristics (that of men in 
equation 6)? D: Pure discrimination effect. 
ii) If men and women were facing the same remuneration structure (that of women in equation 7) ? 
E: Pure difference-in-characteristics effect. 
2.4. Implementation issues 
The practical implementation of the method consists in two phases. Earnings equations are estimated 
by year, sex and ownership. Estimated coefficients are then used to run micro-simulations and evaluate 
average values for each of the effects presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
A general issue concerning decompositions of the Oaxaca-Blinder type concerns path-dependency 
(Fournier, 2005). Indeed, evaluated effects a priori depend on the benchmark population structure or 
coefficient vector chosen to run micro-simulations. In the following, each possible evaluation is considered 
and min-max intervals are reported, which can be considered as a robustness test6. 
 In order to analyze differences in discrimination across different ownership structures, earning 
functions by ownership are estimated and used to run the preceding decompositions by ownership as well as 
for the total. Doing so brings in an additional dimension when comparing results obtained for the total to 
results derived for different ownerships: differences in the distribution of males and females across different 
ownership enterprises. Analyzing thoroughly this issue would require formal modeling and simulation of 
enterprise type choices by sex7. This however goes far beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on 
                                                 
6 For static decompositions, each effect can be evaluated in four different ways depending on the choice of reference 
populations and coefficient vectors. For dynamic decompositions, two different evaluations can be derived depending 
on the choice of reference years for population and coefficient vectors. 
7 This issue has been addressed by Meng and Miller (1995) for rural China.  
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earnings discrimination within enterprise types. We chose here to stick to simple re-weighting procedures to 
provide a preliminary assessment of the magnitude of these phenomena.  
 
3. Gender earnings gap in urban China and its evolution from 1988 to 1995 
3. 1. Data sources 
 Data used in this paper come from two comparable urban household income surveys from the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP)8 for years 1988 and 1995. The data cover 9,009 households and 31,827 
individuals across 10 provinces in 1988 and 6,931 households and 21,694 individuals across 11 provinces in 
19959. Contrary to Gustafsson and Li (2000) who include owners and employees of private and individual 
enterprises, we chose to restrict our analysis to wage-workers aged between 16 and 60, who declared working 
at least part of the year. Due to the lack of reliable information on wages for private or individual enterprises, 
we further restricted our sample to four categories of enterprise ownership: State Owned Enterprises at 
central or provincial level (CSOEs), local public-owned enterprises (LSOEs), urban collective enterprises 
(UCEs) and foreign invested enterprises10 (FIEs). Enterprise ownership can be used as proxies for the 
advancement in market liberalization, State-owned enterprises being the less liberalized and foreign-invested 
enterprises the most liberalized whatever the year. Following Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), we can also 
“speculate that the collective firms are intermediate cases since their budget constraints are clearly firmer than 
those in the state sector” (p. 719). 
The total annual earnings variable is defined as the sum of the basic wage, bonuses, allowances 
(except those received for “waiting for a job”, xiagang), subsidies (including housing, healthcare, childcare and 
regional subsidies), other wages, other income from work unit, as well as income in kind11. Moreover, to 
account for regional price variations, earnings are adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences, by 
                                                 
8 Details are provided in Riskin et al. (2001). See also Gustafsson and Li (2000). 
9 Sichuan province has been added in the 1995 survey. All other provinces are the same in both years: Beijing, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Yunnan, Gansu and Hubei. For data comparability, we restrict our 
analysis to the 10 provinces surveyed in the two years (see Gustafsson and Li, 2000). 
10 Foreign-invested enterprises include both Sino-foreign joint-ventures and foreign-owned enterprises. 
11 As some people declare working only part of the year, wages are adjusted to “full-year working equivalent”. 
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using Brandt and Holz (2005) urban provincial-level spatial price deflators (the reference being nationwide 
prices in 1995). 
 
3. 2. Gender differences in earnings 
 Table 1 presents preliminary statistics on average salaries by ownership and by sex, which provides an 
evaluation of the evolution of the gender earnings gap between 1988 and 1995. As shown in this table, men 
are paid on average nearly 20% more than women, the gap slightly narrowing over time from 18.7% in 1988 
to 17.8% in 199512. In terms of ownership distribution, the gender earnings gap has considerably reduced for 
foreign-invested enterprises (from 34.1% in 1988 to 11.1% in 1995), and in a lesser extent for central SOEs 
and for urban collectives, and it has remained stable for local SOEs (from 15.2% to 15.3%). These non-
uniform changes across ownership lead to quite different patterns in terms of earnings differentials by sex 
between 1988 and 1995: in 1988, the gap was by far the largest in foreign-invested enterprises while it is the 
smallest in 1995. In 1995, the highest differential is observed in urban collectives, followed by local SOEs and 
central SOEs. Hence, the overall modest change in the male/female earnings gap between 1988 and 1995 
results from the combination of sizeable contrasting evolutions within different ownership structures. 
Although consistent with both Qian (1996) and Gustafsson and Li (2000), these results differ strongly from 
both Liu et al. (2000) and Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), who highlight larger gender wage gaps in the 
most liberalized sectors. One explanation can be found in the different samples used in these studies. Indeed, 
Liu et al. (2000) only consider two cities. Moreover, our finding of a large decrease in the gender earnings gap 
for FIEs between 1988 and 1995 stresses the fact that various years can exhibit quite different pictures. 
Hence, Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) findings for 1991 can be seen as consistent with our results, with a 
                                                 
12 This result differs from Gustafsson and Li (2000) who found a modest increase in gender wage gap (from 18.5% to 
21.2%). Two main reasons can explain this difference: first, our sample is restricted to wage workers only and excludes 
private and individual enterprises, and second, we have adjusted earnings for unemployed days. 
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male/female wage differential for FIEs of 25.4%13, which lies within the values obtained here for 1988 and 
1995. 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the overall differential across the range of enterprises in 1995 is 
noticeably higher than differentials by ownership taken separately (except for urban collectives), which 
suggests that an important aspect of discrimination against women arises from their being over-represented in 
enterprises paying lower wages (urban collectives), whereas men are proportionately more numerous in 
higher-paying enterprises14. This observation is consistent with Maurer-Fazio et al. (1999) findings at the 
aggregate level, indicating that a “large portion of the gender wage differences in China’s urban labor market 
arises because of the over-representation of women in low-wage industries” (p. 81). This issue can be further 
analyzed through re-weighting procedures as shown in Table 2. The use of a common distribution by 
ownership (either that observed for men or that observed for women) enables to monitor the impact of 
differences in distributions by ownership between the two sexes. Our findings show that the proportion of 
the observed earnings gap that can be directly attributed to differences in the distribution of men and women 
across enterprises amounts to 3 to 4 percentage points. This indirect discrimination arises from the fact that 
women are over-represented in low-wage urban collectives whereas men are over-represented in higher-
paying central SOEs.  
The bottom part of Table 2 provides additional and complementary information on the impact of 
differences in the male and female distributions across enterprises on the gender earnings gap. Re-weighting 
by the distribution observed for the other year shows that half of the 0.9 percentage point observed decrease 
in the gender earnings gap between 1988 and 1995 can be attributed to changes in the relative employment 
between enterprises, which have been in favor of local SOEs for both men and women from 1988 to 1995. 
Indeed, in 1995 local SOEs employ 55.2% of female workers and 56.2% of male workers, while the shares in 
1988 were respectively 38.6% and 42.2%. This concentration in local SOEs tends to homogenize the 
                                                 
13 The figure is computed from Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002, Table 2, p. 720), as the difference between average 
male wage and average female wage as a percentage of average female wage. 
14 The over-representation of women in low paying collective enterprises is a well-documented phenomenon of the 
Chinese labor market. As emphasized by Qian (1996), it is “partially a result of the Chinese government effort to 
mobilize women to participate in the labor market”. However, since the collective sector offers “lower wages, less 
benefits and limited career development, people consider it a less desirable sector” (p. 79). 
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distribution of men and women across enterprises, which in turn reduces the importance of ownership 
segregation in the gender earnings differential.  
Another important aspect concerns the earnings distribution by sex within ownership. Gini 
coefficients provided in Table 1 show some interesting features. First, in 1988, earnings inequality for both 
men and women was notably higher in FIEs, where salaries were also by far the highest. Thus, earnings 
dispersion was the highest in the most liberalized sector in 1988, which is consistent with Maurer-Fazio and 
Hughes (2002) findings for 1991. On the opposite, earnings inequality was the lowest in local SOEs, where 
Gini coefficients were only 18.4% for women and 19.5% for men. Second, the comparison between 1988 and 
1995 shows a large increase in overall earnings inequality for both men (from 21.1% to 26.2%) and women 
(from 21.5% to 27.5%). Moreover, this increase has been especially sharp in both local SOEs and urban 
collectives. In terms of changes in earnings inequality over time, FIEs exhibit levels of inequality quite similar 
to urban collectives and local SOEs in 1995 since Gini coefficients only slightly increased in FIEs. Hence, 
further liberalization of the economy between 1988 and 1995 led to higher earnings inequality within 
domestic enterprises and a catching-up process as compared to foreign enterprises. 
To further analyze the distribution issue, Figure 1 presents male/female observed earnings 
differentials by earnings percentile of each gender income distribution for each ownership type. Each curve 
should be read in terms of difference: for the median, the curve represents the difference between male 
median and female median earnings as a percentage of the female median earnings. The overall distribution 
shows sizeable changes between 1998 and 1995. Indeed, the rather flat curve in 1988 turns into a down-
sloping curve in 1995, stressing a higher gender differential at the bottom of the earnings scale. Hence, the 
overall gender earnings gap has increased for low wage earners, while it has decreased for high wage earners. 
Moreover, this relative deterioration of the earnings gap at the lower part of the distribution can be found 
within each enterprise type, except for local SOEs where the evolution is less clear-cut. 
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4. Estimation results 
Earnings regressions by enterprise ownership and by sex are reported in Table 3 for 1988 and in 
Table 4 for 199515. Since the choice of enterprise and the related expected remuneration are closely linked, 
estimating earnings functions for enterprises of different ownership would require controlling for potential 
selection biases. However, we chose here to treat enterprise’s choice as exogenous for two main reasons16. 
First, since labor was still administratively allocated in China up to 1995, the enterprise’s choice cannot be 
fully considered as the result of an individual choice17. Second, achieving identification for enterprise’s choice 
is problematic since no available variable can be considered as a fully exogenous instrument18. Nonetheless, it 
should be stressed here that there may still be selectivity problems, which calls for a cautious interpretation of 
our estimations results. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of total annual earnings and explanatory variables include 
individual human capital characteristics (education and experience), economic sector, geographical residence 
and household characteristics19. Given the small number of observations for FIEs, we are limited in the 
number of explanatory variables that can be introduced without reducing the robustness of our estimations20. 
Moreover, the issue of which variable to include in the wage regression when measuring wage discrimination 
is highly controversial. On one hand, the choice of explanatory variables for the earnings equation may raise a 
concern for the concept of wage discrimination, which commonly refers to the part of unexplained earnings 
gap between men and women. Because income variations across regions or industries are potential important 
sources of gender earnings differentials, more disaggregated levels for geographic and industrial attributes 
may be required. Similarly, the potential different distribution of men and women across positions and 
occupations in the same enterprise may also account for the identified “gender discrimination”. However, 
                                                 
15 Chow tests performed to test the null hypothesis that the beta coefficients in earnings equations between two different 
ownerships are the same all indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the one percent level. 
16 Zhao (2002) and Chen et al. (2005) make similar choices.  
17 In particular, until 1995, graduate students from universities in China were assigned to a particular job according to 
central planning related labour allocation mechanisms.  
18 Chen et al. (2005) mention the relative employment shares in different enterprise types at the city level as potential 
instruments. Information on cities is unfortunately not fully reliable for 1988. 
19 Reference categories for regional location and economic sector are respectively non-coastal region and secondary 
sector (industry and construction).  
20 More detailed specifications for men and women earnings functions can be found in Gustafsson and Li (2000), who 
however do not provide any distinction by ownership type. 
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some of these explanatory variables, including industry and occupation, are clearly endogenous, with no 
variable in our data to credibly instrument those endogenous variables. Hence, given data limitation, we chose 
to limit the potential for endogeneity bias by estimating a reduced form of the earnings equation, which does 
not include all the theoretically required explanatory variables. We thus acknowledge that one should keep the 
potential omitted variable bias in mind when interpreting the results. However, alternate specifications, 
including extended specifications as well as a minimal specification including only human capital variables 
(education and experience) have been estimated and all led to similar decomposition results21. 
Another concern about the accuracy of our estimates can arise from the very small number of 
observations for the foreign sector. Since it was still in its emerging phase in 1995, the foreign sector was 
indeed accounting for a very small share of employment (although higher than ours) in China. Being aware of 
this strong weakness of the data, we nevertheless chose to keep this category in our analysis as a reference 
category for the most liberalized sector in 1995 only. Although we present results for both 1988 and 1995, we 
do not interpret them for 1988 and remain cautious for 1995. 
Earnings equation regressions reported in Table 3 and Table 422 show returns to education ranging 
from 2.5% to 3.9% in 1988 depending on enterprise ownership, and ranging from 2.9% to 9.9% in 1995. The 
only cases where education is not significant are foreign-invested enterprises for men in 1995 and for both 
men and women in 1988, where the much smaller number of observations certainly affects the robustness of 
our results. For domestic enterprises, our results are consistent with the literature on returns to education in 
urban China, including Li (2003), Yueh (2004) and Zhao (2002). In terms of gender differences, our 
estimations show significant differences for both central and local SOEs in 1988 and in 1995, returns to 
education being higher for women.  
The usual concave form for work experience23 is found for nearly all estimations, the main 
exceptions being for foreign-invested enterprises. The estimation of separate earnings functions by ownership 
                                                 
21 All results presented in the following of the paper are based on an intermediate specification. Robustness tests using 
alternative (reduced or extended) specifications are available from the authors. 
22 Comparisons of estimated coefficients across equations given in the following comments are made only for 
differences that are statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
23 Experience is measured here as potential work experience calculated from age and the number of years of schooling.  
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shows that the remuneration of experience is not uniform across ownership and gender. Women tend to have 
steeper but more concave returns to experience than men, thus reaching their wage peak earlier. For women, 
experience is significantly better rewarded in central SOEs than in local SOEs in 1988, and women’s wage 
premium for job experience in central SOEs is even significantly higher than for men. For men, experience is 
more uniformly remunerated across ownership. Lastly, the absence of significant returns to experience in 
foreign-invested enterprises certainly comes from the fact that workers in foreign-invested enterprises are 
much younger and have less experience. It also highlights a specificity of this newly developed form of 
ownership, in which experience accumulated on former SOEs positions may not be associated with efficiency 
gains. 
Earnings differentials by geographical location in domestic enterprises show that workers in coastal 
provinces earn on average 2 to 14% more than workers in inland provinces in 1988, and that the gap 
significantly increased in 1995 to 23-43%. The wage premium for being along the coast in 1988 was 
significantly lower in local SOEs than in both central SOEs and urban collectives for men and women. But 
the strong increase in the premium for local SOEs in 1995 led to a reversal of the relative position of local 
SOEs compared to central SOEs that became the lowest coastal wage premium paying.  
 
5. Decomposition results 
5. 1. Dynamic evolution of gender wage gaps, 1988-95 
Table 5 provides evaluations of the impact of changes in both discrimination and endowments on 
observed gender earnings differentials between 1988 and 1995 by ownership. First, as discussed in details in 
section 3, it shows that the income gap between men and women has decreased as a whole, and for all 
ownerships, except for local SOEs, over the 1988-95 period. However, the decomposition of the modest 
observed decrease in the earnings gap reveals two opposite forces. First, the overall change in endowments 
has led to a relative improvement of women characteristics as compared to men. If alone, this change would 
have led to a much larger decrease in the overall gender wage gap (5.1 to 5.5 percentage points instead of the 
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observed 0.9 percentage point). However, this equalizing force has been offset by a concomitant increase of 
discrimination, which would have led to a 4.1 to 4.6 percentage points’ increase in the overall gender earnings 
gap, had endowments remained unchanged. 
Figure 2 presents decomposition results on the earnings percentiles scale. It shows that changes in 
endowments have had a rather uniform impact along the earning scale, while rising discrimination has been 
much stronger at the bottom of the distribution. This implies that the relative widening of the gender 
earnings gap for low-wage earners as compared to high-wage earners mainly comes from a stronger increase 
in discrimination for low-wage workers. This result is consistent with Li and Gustafsson (2000) findings that 
the earnings situation of young women and women with limited education (thus, at the lower end of the 
female earnings distribution) has especially deteriorated compared to men with similar characteristics. It is 
also consistent with Bishop et al. (2005) findings using quantile regressions based decomposition procedures24. 
Turning to differences by ownership, Table 5 reveals quite different patterns across enterprises, 
especially in terms of discrimination. Indeed, it shows an increase in discrimination for both central and local 
SOEs (especially high in local SOEs), and a decrease for urban collectives25. For central SOEs, the 
convergence in income between men and women thus entirely comes from a catching up in terms of 
endowments, which may have been partly compensated by an increase in discrimination.  
In the case of local SOEs, the catching up in terms of endowments is fully compensated by a strong 
rise in discrimination (between 5.5 and 5.7 percentage points), which affected more strongly both the bottom 
and the top of the distribution (Figure 2). An opposite feature characterizes urban collectives since they 
experienced a decrease in discrimination associated with diverging endowments. As shown in Figure 2, the 
overall decrease in discrimination only affected the upper part of the distribution while among the poorest, 
discrimination seems to have increased.  
                                                 
24 Although Bishop et al. focus their comments on the decreasing share of the “unexplained” component in the total gap, 
their results however show a clear increase in the level of this component over time for lower income levels (tables 3a 
and 3b, column 5, page 256). 
25 For FIEs, the impact is less straightforward as suggested by the negative and positive signs of the min and max 
interval. Since decompositions of earnings differentials for FIEs are made on a very small sample for 1988, we do not 
interpret further these results and restrict the analysis of gender discrimination in FIEs to 1995. 
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These results reveal an interesting evolution in domestic enterprises’ behaviors throughout the 
reform period. Indeed, enterprises that experienced the greatest increase in discrimination against women are 
SOEs and not urban collectives where discrimination on the contrary substantially decreased. As for the 
comparison of discriminatory behaviors between state-owned enterprises and others, Meng and Miller (1995) 
argue that where employment and wages are decided by the government, the government makes efforts to 
improve the position of women in order to counterbalance traditional segregation against women inherited 
from Confucian thoughts. Our results suggest that throughout the reform process, the government, and 
especially local governments, have tended to pay less attention to this issue and have progressively decreased 
their pressure on gender equality. Conversely, our results for urban collectives suggest that within these 
enterprises, market reforms and increased competition from other types of enterprises may have brought 
more “market-oriented” behaviors, leading to a decrease in costly and inefficient discrimination against 
women26. 
 
5. 2. Comparison between 1988 and 1995 
 Tables 6 and 7 present static decomposition results for 1988 and 1995, by ownership, as discussed in 
Section 2. In 1988, 5.8 to 7.3 percentage points of the observed gap (31 to 39% of the total differential) came 
from differences in endowment between men and women, and 11.4 to 12.9 percentage points (61 to 69% of 
the total differential) came from discrimination against women. In 1995, the respective figures were 3.7 to 6.9 
percentage points (21 to 39% of the total differential) for differences in endowment and 10.8 to 14 
percentage points (61 to 79% of the total differential) for discrimination. Thus, the shares of both 
components remained approximately constant over time, discrimination against women explaining around 
two-third of total observed gender earnings differentials in urban China. This implies that in the absence of 
                                                 
26 We should also note that, as it is controversial in the literature whether the unexplained portion of gender wage gap is 
attributable to gender discrimination in wages or to unobserved productivity difference between men and women, 
alternative interpretations for the residual wage gap could also be given. For instance, the rising discrimination found in 
the state sector may also reflect the fact that earnings in SOEs are becoming more related to unobserved skills of 
individual workers and less to their observable attributes such as education attainments or seniority over time. Similarly, 
the declining weight of residual wage gap observed in the urban collectives could also be attributed to more 
individualistic initial wage structures. 
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discrimination, the gender earnings differential would have been 10 to 14 percentage points lower than the 
18-19% differential observed in 1988 and in 1995.  
As for ownership categories, Tables 6 and 7 also show substantial differences in the proportion of 
observed differentials arising from direct discrimination against women. Indeed, in 1988, discrimination was 
particularly high in central SOEs and in urban collectives, where it explained most of the observed gender 
wage gap, while in local SOEs, discrimination phenomena explained between 55 and 63% of the observed 
gap. However, throughout the period, the most substantial change arose within local SOEs, where 
discrimination sharply increased and explains most of observed gender wage differentials in 1995. These 
results confirm that market liberalization has had a very different impact on discrimination against women 
across the different types of domestic enterprises. 
 Turning to foreign-invested enterprises, our decompositions results highlight quite different features. 
Since the number of observations is much smaller for these enterprises, especially in 1988, we will limit 
interpretations to the year 1995 only. For this particular year, our decompositions do not support the 
hypothesis of discrimination against women in FIEs and even suggest some possible discrimination against 
men27. Hence, in 1995, the most market-oriented enterprises were also those in which discrimination against 
women was the lowest. As discussed for urban collectives, this suggests that market forces have helped 
reducing the gap between men and women by improving incentives for enterprises to adopt rational 
behaviors. Our results for 1995 thus show a clear opposition between domestic enterprises and foreign-
invested enterprises. In the former, we find a marked discrimination against women, which combined with 
differences in average characteristics, causes a large overall pay differential between men and women. In the 
latter, gender earnings differential is mainly due to differences in characteristics and discrimination 
phenomena play no significant role. A higher level of discrimination in domestic enterprises than in foreign-
invested enterprises supports the hypothesis that the search for efficiency in foreign-invested firms, which are 
more subject to market mechanisms, tends to encourage flexibility and lower discrimination. 
 
                                                 
27 Similar results have been found by Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), who show that in competitively obtained jobs, 
gender wage gaps are much reduced and discrimination against women is negligible. 
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6. Conclusion 
 Economic reforms and market liberalization in urban China from the mid-80s onwards have greatly 
affected gender wage differentials and discrimination against women. As emphasized in this paper, the 
resulting changes are made of a complex set of evolutions across enterprises, earnings distributions and time, 
which call for a careful analysis. Our approach combines the time dimension to the ownership dimension, 
adding new valuable information to the understanding of the role played by the reforms in gender wage gaps 
changes. 
First, we find that the overall gender wage gap has been slightly narrowing over time, from 18.7% in 
1988 to 17.7% in 1995. This modest change is shown to result from contrasting evolutions across different 
ownership structures, with a decreasing differential observed for foreign-invested enterprises, central SOEs 
and urban collectives, and an increasing differential for local SOEs. Second, wage dispersion is found to be 
the highest in the most liberalized sector in 1988, but further liberalization of the economy between 1988 and 
1995 led to a rise in wage inequality within domestic enterprises resulting in a catching-up of foreign-invested 
enterprises. Third, we find that while the overall gender earnings gap has remained grossly stable, it has 
increased for the lower deciles of the wage distribution and decreased for high wage earners. 
As for discrimination against women, we first show that part of the observed wage differential arises 
from women being over-represented in enterprises paying lower wages, whereas men are proportionately 
more numerous in high-pay enterprises. The segmentation of the labor market and differences in the 
distribution of men and women across enterprises lead to a first form of discrimination against women: the 
proportion of the observed earnings gap that may be directly attributed to these differences amounts to 3 to 4 
percentage points. Moreover, in dynamic terms, half of the 0.9 percentage point observed decrease in the 
gender earnings gap between 1988 and 1995 comes from evolutions in distribution structures of men and 
women across enterprises. 
Decomposing gender earnings differentials into endowment differences and discrimination 
phenomena allows for further exploration of the discrimination issue. First, our results indicate that in 1988, 
discrimination was quite strong in domestic enterprises, and mainly affected the top deciles of the female 
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earnings distribution. Hence, at the beginning of the industrial reforms, discrimination against women was 
most prominent in qualified occupations, whereas it was much lower for low-paying jobs. This implies that at 
the end of the 80s, the government control over wage settings aiming at gender equality was better enforced 
for lower wages than for the highest paying jobs. Second, economic reforms brought about some significant 
changes to discriminatory behaviors, which have affected differently the various segments of the urban labor 
market. Our results highlight a rise in discrimination in SOEs, concentrated at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution. These changes can be considered as reflecting a “catching-up” of discrimination along the female 
earnings distribution since the discrimination pattern in 1995 is quite flat across income deciles. Conversely, 
urban collectives experienced decreasing discrimination, affecting the top of the distribution and leading to an 
equalization of discrimination on the income scale. Lastly, our results do not support the hypothesis of 
discrimination against women for foreign-invested enterprises in 1995 and even seem to suggest the 
possibility of discrimination against men. In distributive terms, they indicate that if any, discriminatory 
behaviors are restricted to low-wage female earners.  
Market liberalization thus appears to have affected quite differently enterprises of different 
ownership. On the one hand, our results suggest that the Chinese State has paid less attention to the gender 
equality issue over time while on the other hand, market competition seems to have helped reducing 
discriminatory behaviors. Moreover, our findings stress quite unequal changes across the range of earnings 
distribution from 1988 to 1995: while in 1988, discrimination tended to be highest for the higher deciles of 
the earnings distribution, the trend has been either annulated or reversed by 1995. Richest women have thus 
seen their relative position improving while the poorest have seen their relative position deteriorating28. 
Consistent with Liu et al. (2000) and Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), our results highlight the 
interplay of opposing forces, economic reforms contributing to changes in entrepreneurs’ (or managers’) 
behaviors in various dimensions First, the decentralization process led to a growing importance of 
decentralized choices in wage-setting decisions, leaving space for managers’ preferences and potentially 
unequal treatment of women. Thus, moving from the communist egalitarian ideology to a decentralized 
                                                 
28 Relative improvement or deterioration here are to be understood in terms of difference in differences: women’s 
earnings relative to men’s earnings at different positions on the income scale. 
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system of wage determination seems to have led to an increase in discrimination in local SOEs, and to a lesser 
extent in central SOEs. Our results also suggest that discriminatory behaviors against women have increased 
the most at the bottom of the earnings distribution, which was still most protected in 1988, thus leading to a 
more equal distribution of discrimination along the wage scale. Second, economic reforms not only brought 
about decentralization but also market competition, which is expected to favor more efficient behaviors in 
terms of wage settings. Discrimination being a source of inefficiency, further liberalization may tend to reduce 
discriminatory behaviors, which is what our results suggest for urban collectives over time and to some extent 
in 1995 for the comparison of foreign-invested enterprises and domestic enterprises.  
Different forces are thus at stake to explain changes in gender discrimination, which are related to 
differences in the institutional structure of the various types of enterprises. On the one hand, by relaxing 
institutional rules, market liberalization weakened both the central and local governments equalizing role on 
wage setting rules, leaving space for discrimination to arise in state-owned enterprises. Our results suggest 
that this is especially true for local SOEs, which have experienced a large increase in discrimination. Being of 
a smaller size and farther from the direct control of the central government, these enterprises enjoyed a 
greater discretion in wage determination although still protected from competition and benefiting from soft 
budget constraints. On the other hand, increased competition induced by the development of market 
mechanisms actually favored the reduction of discriminating behaviors in enterprises outside the State 
planning structure, as highlighted here for both urban collectives and foreign-invested enterprises. These 
concomitant and opposite evolutions can explain why, at the aggregate level, changes are so modest. They 
also confirm results from Liu et al. (2000) and Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) on the difficulty to assess the 
role of economic reforms on the relative position of women in urban China. 
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Table 1 – Average earnings by ownership and by sex, 1988-1995 
Ownership categories All workers(1) SOEs at central or 
provincial level 
Local publicly owned Urban collectives Foreign-invested 
enterprises 
         Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
1988           
           
          
            
     
          
Observations 7,874 8,442 2,656 3,571 3,032 3,550 2,136 1,273 29 27
Earnings(2) 3,726 4,424 4,058 4,669 3,824 4,406 3,192 3,798 4,533 6,078
Gini coefficients 0.215 0.211 0.225 0.205 0.184 0.195 0.216 0.234 0.249 0.302
Gender earnings gap (%)(3) 18.7 15.1 15.2 19.0 34.1
 
1995           
           
           
            
Observations 4,154 4,653 940 1,416 2,275 2,601 852 545 50 59
Earnings 5,368 6,325 6,115 6,912 5,400 6,225 4,398 5,152 6993 7,770
Gini coefficients 0.275 0.262 0.243 0.230 0.264 0.264 0.297 0.280 0.273 0.316
Gender earnings gap (%) 17.8 13.0 15.3 17.1 11.1 
Source: Authors calculation based on the 1988 and the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: 1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and earning (positive) wages. Owners and employees of private or individual 
enterprises are excluded. 
2. The earnings variable is defined as being the sum of the basic wage, bonuses, allowances and subsidies, other wages, other income from work unit and income in kind. 
3. The gender earnings gap is computed as the difference between men’s earnings and women’s earnings, as a percentage of women’s earnings. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Differences in the gender distribution by ownership and gender earnings gaps 
 1988 1995 
 Women Men Women Men 
Observed average earnings 3,726 4,424 5,368 6,325 
Observed men/women earnings gap 18.7% 17.8% 
Observed evolution of earnings differential 
(percentage points) 
- 0.9 
Re-weighting by the opposite sex distribution     
Counterfactual average earnings 3,820 4,324 5,483 6,124 
Counterfactual men/women earnings gap     
    Women distribution by ownership applied to men 16.1% 14.1% 
    Men distribution by ownership applied to women 15.8% 15.4% 
Difference between observed and counterfactual gaps in percentage points 
    Women distribution by ownership applied to men 2.7 3.8 
    Men distribution by ownership applied to women 2.9 2.5 
Re-weighting by the distribution observed for the other year
Counterfactual average earnings 3,722 4,406 5,361 6,343 
Counterfactual men/women earnings gap 18.4% 18.3% 
Counterfactual evolution of earnings differential in percentage points 
    With the 1988 distribution by ownership  - 0.4 
    With the 1995 distribution by ownership - 0.5 
Source: Authors calculation based on the 1988 and the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: The gender earnings gap is computed as the difference between men’s earnings and women’s earnings, as a 
percentage of women’s earnings. 
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Table 3 - Earnings equations (1988) 
 Central SOEs Local SOEs Urban collectives  Foreign-invested 
Enterprises 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Education 0.025** 0.033** 0.028** 0.035** 0.036** 0.039** 0.016 0.015 
 12.66 10.69 13.90 14.12 7.60 9.44 0.31 0.38 
Experience 0.047** 0.056** 0.051** 0.046** 0.051** 0.049** 0.083 0.071* 
 25.51 20.08 28.19 21.37 15.14 14.93 1.43 2.14 
Experience 2 -0.0006** -0.001** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0008** -0.0011 -0.0008
 -15.49 -13.98 -17.71 -12.82 -8.98 -10.49 -0.60 -0.75 
# dependent  0.060* 0.048 0.018 0.056* 0.045 -0.002 0.148 0.183 
     members 2.60 1.52 0.90 2.57 1.12 -0.05 0.36 0.40 
Household size -0.048** -0.049** -0.040** -0.048** -0.053** -0.060** -0.091 -0.224*
 -8.95 -6.61 -7.40 -8.18 -5.31 -7.03 -0.61 -2.14 
Tertiary sector -0.035* -0.022 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.029 0.341 0.131 
 -3.17 -1.43 -0.99 -1.31 -0.46 -1.64 1.33 0.80 
Coast 0.120** 0.130** 0.038** 0.019 0.111** 0.140** 0.504 -0.563 
 9.50 7.61 3.48 1.52 5.18 7.75 1.27 -1.24 
Constant 7.595** 7.403** 7.452** 7.441** 7.304** 7.262** 7.055** 8.650**
 202.74 132.91 200.34 169.90 99.58 106.41 6.56 13.22 
         
Observations 3555 2641 3536 3023 1266 2129 27 29 
R2  0.36 0.26 0.38 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.51 0.62 
Notes:  1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total earnings. 
2. The reference category for regional location is the non-coastal region. The coastal dummy variable takes 1 
for Beijing, Guangdong and Jiangsu, and 0 for the seven other provinces included in the data set.  
3. The reference for economic sector is the secondary sector (including industry and construction). 
4. Numbers in italics are t-statistics. * Significant at 5 percent level ** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 4 - Earnings equations (1995) 
 Central SOEs Local SOEs Urban collectives  Foreign-invested 
Enterprises 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Education 0.029** 0.060** 0.049** 0.058** 0.058** 0.047** 0.057 0.099* 
 6.16 8.09 13.11 11.10 5.19 5.09 1.35 2.77 
Experience 0.047** 0.071** 0.044** 0.083** 0.052** 0.077** 0.024 0.024 
 10.41 9.92 12.61 17.33 5.41 9.64 0.90 0.66 
Experience 2 -0.0006** -0.0014** -0.0006** -0.0018** -0.0009** -0.0017** -0.0002 0.0003 
 -6.51 -7.76 -7.42 -14.84 -4.10 -9.05 -0.33 0.28 
# dependent  -0.055 0.004 0.007 -0.058* 0.014 -0.072 0.115 -0.123 
     members -1.63 0.08 0.29 -1.99 0.21 -1.58 0.61 -0.73 
Household size -0.025 -0.022 -0.064** -0.053** -0.061 -0.052* 0.088 0.052 
 -1.53 -0.92 -5.17 -3.24 -1.67 -2.04 0.89 0.58 
Tertiary sector 0.072* 0.038 0.046* 0.031 -0.155* -0.002 -0.142 0.122 
 2.93 1.05 2.52 1.30 -2.85 -0.06 -0.78 0.82 
Coast 0.234** 0.250** 0.337** 0.307** 0.291** 0.432** -0.016 0.314 
 8.28 6.14 17.33 12.42 5.57 11.19 -0.08 1.76 
Constant 7.727** 7.129** 7.496** 7.078** 7.295** 7.056** 7.534** 6.730**
 79.93 47.13 99.47 68.40 32.75 41.02 10.39 8.04 
         
Observations 1416 940 2601 2275 545 852 59 50 
R2  0.23 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.11 0.29 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
Table 5 – Dynamic decomposition of wage differentials between men and women, by ownership (1988-95) 
Observed incomes Observed incomes Decomposition of the observed change in differential  
in 1988 in 1995 Change in endowments Change in discrimination 
Ownership Women        Men Women Men Min Max Min Max
Total         3733 4431 5375 6329
   Observed differential 18.7%      17.7%
   Observed change in differential -0.9%  -5.5% -5.1% 4.1% 4.6%
         
Central SOEs 4058 4671 6115 6912     
   Observed differential 15.1%      13.0%
   Observed change in differential -2.1%  -5.2% -1.8% -0.3% 3.2%
         
Local SOEs 3825 4404 5400 6225     
   Observed differential 15.2%      15.3%
   Observed change in differential 0.1%  -5.6% -5.3% 5.5% 5.7%
         
Urban Collectives 3190 3799 4398 5152     
   Observed differential 19.1%      17.2%
   Observed change in differential -1.9%  3.0% 4.1% -6.0% -5.0%
         
Foreign-Invested Enterprises 4533 6078 6993 7770     
   Observed differential 34.1%      11.1%
   Observed change in differential -23.0%     -44.7% 5.0% -28.0% 21.7%
Notes: Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 6 – Static decomposition of gender earnings differentials by ownership (1988) 
Ownership categories Observed average 
earnings 
Differential Decomposition of the observed earnings differential 
     Endowments Discrimination
  Men Women  
Min Max  Min Max
Total        4431 3733 698 217 273 425 481
        18.7% 5.8% 7.3% 11.4% 12.9%
Central SOEs         4671 4058 613 46 165 448 567
        15.1% 1.1% 4.1% 11.0% 14.0%
Local SOEs        4404 3825 580 212 261 318 368
        15.2% 5.5% 6.8% 8.3% 9.6%
Urban Collectives 3799 3190 609 49 65 544 560 
        19.1% 1.5% 2.0% 17.1% 17.5%
Foreign-Invested Enterprises 6078 4533 1545 748 1272 273 797 
        34.1% 16.5% 28.1% 6.0% 17.6%
Notes: Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Table 3. 
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Table 7 – Static decomposition of gender earnings differentials by ownership (1995) 
Ownership categories Observed average 
earnings 
Differential Decomposition of the observed earnings differential 
     Endowments Discrimination
  Men Women  
Min Max  Min Max
Total        6329 5375 954 202 374 580 752
        17.7% 3.7% 6.9% 10.8% 14.0%
Central SOEs        6912 6115 797 43 121 676 754
        13.0% 0.7% 2.0% 11.1% 12.3%
Local SOEs        6225 5400 826 27 228 597 799
        15.3% 0.5% 4.2% 11.1% 14.8%
Urban Collectives        5152 4398 754 99 276 479 656
        17.2% 2.2% 6.3% 10.9% 14.9%
Foreign-Invested Enterprises 7770 6993 776 1031 1218 -442 -254 
        11.1% 14.7% 17.4% -6.3% -3.6%
Notes: Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 – Observed male-female earnings differentials by earnings percentiles 
 
Total
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 20 40 60 80 100
CSOEs
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 20 40 60 80 100
LSOEs
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
UCEs
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
FIEs
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Total - Evolution (1995-1988)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Evolution
1988
1995
 30
Figure 2 – Dynamic decompositions of the observed male-female earnings differential by earnings percentiles 
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Notes: Simulated curves correspond to the averages of various possible evaluations of measured effects (see Section 2.4).  
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